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RIGHTS LAWYER ESSENTIALISM AND THE
NEXT GENERATION OF RIGHTS CRITICS
Alan K. Chen*
How LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALIBy Richard Thompson Ford. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

RIGHTS GONE WRONG:
TY.

2011. Pp. 272. $27.
INTRODUCTION

Richard Thompson Ford' does not care much for the current state of civil rights. In his provocative new book, Rights Gone Wrong: How Law
Corrupts the Struggle for Equality, Ford lends an original, if often misdirected, voice to the chorus of contemporary critics of the American legal
regime of rights. 2 Situating himself among "second generation" rights critics

(p. 259), Ford lays out a comprehensive indictment of current approaches to
civil rights litigation as well as civil rights activism. His work is both intriguing and provocative, and it raises a number of issues that are surely worth

serious consideration and discussion. As I argue in this Review, however,
while his goals are laudable, his project is ultimately unsuccessful.
Ford's critiques of the contemporary civil rights system can be broken
down into three distinct, but related, themes.3 His first charge is that civil
rights are an anachronism, a once powerful tool to address first-generation
civil rights issues, but now outdated and not up to the task of tackling con-

temporary social problems. While some forms of racial and gender
subordination remain serious issues, he argues that many of the fundamental

battles for equality have been largely won. Ford claims that the civil rights
system today has been captured, and to a large extent exploited, by
* Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship and Professor of Law, University of Denver
Sturm College of Law. I am grateful to Rebecca Aviel, Scott Cummings, Mark Hughes, Pam
Karlan, Tamara Kuennen, Nancy Leong, Justin Marceau, Julie Nice, Helen Norton, Justin
Pidot, Laura Rovner, and Robert Weisberg for their insightful comments on earlier versions of
this Review. I also thank my research assistant, Evan Grimes, and Faculty Services Liaison
Diane Burkhardt for their excellent research support. Finally, thanks to the members of the
Michigan Law Review for their careful and thoughtful editorial work. All errors are mine.
1. George E. Osborne Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
2. See, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES,
AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM
SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM (1986); GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008); STUART A.
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE

(2d ed. 2004).
3. In describing the themes of Ford's work, I map his ideas onto a structure that I
interpret his work as reflecting. As such, the description of his book is not in the same order as
his text's arguments, which I found at times did not follow a clear organizational path.
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self-indulgent individuals seeking to invoke the law (or in the case of activists, the moral high ground of civil rights) not to achieve justice, but to
pursue their idiosyncratic, opportunistic desires for personal gain.4 On this
account, civil rights have outlived their usefulness and accordingly need to
be completely reconceived.
The second central theme of Ford's critique is that the civil rights regime
lacks nuance. Its mechanisms are formalistic and rigid and are therefore
insufficiently adaptable to account for the complex, entrenched issues that
face today's society. Formal antidiscrimination rules not only forbid base
forms of discrimination founded on racist and sexist attitudes, but also are
routinely invoked to attack more benign forms of race and sex classifications, from the serious (affirmative action) to the banal ("ladies' nights" at
bars). 5 But that same system of rights has not proved adaptable to deal with
the more entrenched and unresolved issues that continue to challenge marginalized communities, such as residential segregation and lack of economic
opportunity. Similarly, he attacks the current structure of remedies as being
too rigid and inflexible to address the subtle nature of contemporary civil
rights dilemmas.6 Instead, Ford offers a new vision for civil rights that relies
on an administrative enforcement scheme that he argues will be both more
adaptable and more effective in promoting equality.
Ford's third important theme is a common one among rights critics-he
lays much of the blame for the problems of the civil rights system at the feet
of the lawyers who populate it. Though the book is a broadside attack on
that system, it implicitly-and sometimes quite explicitly-argues that contemporary rights lawyers are responsible for many of the system's abuses.
Like the clients they represent, civil rights lawyers "deserve much of the
blame for twisting and perverting the legacy of civil rights" (p. 11). Among
the charges he makes are that lawyer-driven rights litigation accomplishes
little (and may even be more harmful than helpful), that the role of civil
rights litigation in achieving equality has been overstated, and that lawyers
have created unjustified hope and reliance on civil rights law at the expense
7
of more effective solutions to contemporary social problems.
In this Review, I critique Ford's approach and analysis and argue that his
work is unsuccessful in sustaining any of these major themes. Specifically, I
argue that Ford's sweeping assertions about the civil rights system are
flawed because he bases them on a selective, nonsystematic study of civil
rights that reflects neither the complexity nor the importance of the work
still being done by civil rights law, activism, and lawyers. His approach calls
into serious question the generalizability of his claims. My critique employs
three separate but related examples of the shortcomings of Ford's claims, in
increasing order of importance. First, I suggest that his book's indictment of
the current regime as anachronistic extrapolates only from marginal exam4.
5.
6.

See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section H.A.
Id.

7.

See infra Section I.A.
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pies of contemporary civil rights litigation and activism. These examples fail
to provide a fair representation of what remains an important and relevant
mechanism for the enforcement of equality and public mobilization. As illustrated below, much of his narrative is a catalog of selective anecdotes
about relatively obscure legal claims and atypical protests. Drawing broad
conclusions about the entire civil rights system from these outlier examples
is both unfair and invalid.
A second, related limitation of Ford's book is that its broad-strokes attack on formal antidiscrimination rules and civil rights remedies suffers to a
great degree from the same lack of nuance that he argues plagues the civil
rights system. For example, he asserts that bright-line antidiscrimination
rules against race and gender classifications can have undesirable and unintended consequences when stripped from the central goals of
antisubordination. But he does not recognize that those same rules play an
important role in deterring discrimination and ensuring fundamental equality. Similarly, Ford examines individual civil rights remedies in isolation and
concludes that they are rigid and ineffective. But this critique fails to account for how different types of remedies work together in subtle and
complementary ways to enhance their contribution to the enforcement of
civil rights as called for by the particular context. By disaggregating remedies rather than envisioning them as part of a larger scheme of rights
enforcement, Ford trivializes their collective value.' In contrast to what he
argues, the availability of multiple, alternative forms of remedies systemically increases the nuance of the rights system.
Finally, and most importantly, I contend that Ford's work follows a long
tradition of rights scholars who have criticized civil and other rights enforcement by employing what has essentially become a caricature of rights
lawyers. Virtually all rights critics such as Ford premise their attacks on a
view of contemporary rights lawyers as elitist, singularly minded litigation
hawks who care little for their clients or the subtleties of the dialectic political process.9 This approach, which I call "rights lawyer essentialism,"'1 °
permeates much of the literature, but is based on stereotypes and obsolete
understandings of contemporary public interest practice. It simplistically
suggests that all rights lawyers fit this insulting profile. While litigation has
been a dominant focus of public interest lawyering, closer examination of
the history of American public interest law reveals that lawyers involved in
rights campaigns have always been mindful of the matrix of tools available
to them and the relationship of litigation to other critical forms of social

8. For a general response to critiques that disaggregate civil rights remedies, see Alan
K. Chen, Rosy Pictures and Renegade Officials: The Slow Death of Monroe v. Pape, 78
UMKC L. REV. 889 (2010); Pamela S. Karlan, Disarmingthe Private Attorney General, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 183.
9. The archetype of this attorney in the legal literature is the rights lawyer "Teresa" in
Gerald L6pez's important critical account of public interest law. GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING 13-17 (1992). See infra note 71.
10. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
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reform advocacy.1" Moreover, as this Review illustrates, attention to nonlitigation options has become even more important in contemporary public
interest practice.
Critical examinations of the system of legal rights are valuable. It is important not to allow our biases or nostalgia for past successes to blind us to a
frank consideration of our present. To that end, by raising skepticism about
the current regime, Ford's work is an important contribution to the discourse. But his argument that the civil rights system is anachronistic and
lacks nuance is itself blunt and unrefined, and his critique of civil rights
lawyers is, at the same time, anachronistic.
WHAT'S WRONG WITH RIGHTS GONE WRONG

Rights Gone Wrong is a sweeping critique of what Ford depicts as the
current regime of civil rights in the United States. Ford's commentary is
both broad and ambitious, his insights thought provoking and challenging.
He expresses his view that rights have indeed gone wrong eloquently and
passionately. Moreover, Ford's critique of rights resonates across the
political spectrum. It is dangerously seductive to those on the right, who are
already hostile to civil rights enforcement through litigation and fed up with
large-scale, modem civil rights protests. Its disregard for the atomistic nature of individual rights claims and its call for a collaborative, administrative
approach to complex social issues appeals to the moderation embraced by
communitarians. And it is attractive to those on the left, who have long disputed the value of lawyers and litigation in achieving social change.
At the same time, Ford's book is deeply troubling and is justifiably controversial given its broad swipes at an important aspect of the American
legal narrative. The limitations of his claims derive not from his boldness in
taking on the rights shibboleth, but in his methodology, which calls into serious doubt many of his conclusions and prescriptions. It is exceedingly
difficult to argue for the dismantling of a multifaceted legal regime designed
to address inequality across a wide range of contexts, and Ford's attempt,
while ambitious, is ultimately unsuccessful. I argue that while his three major themes might at first glance seem powerful, they all suffer from
important shortcomings that substantially undermine their persuasiveness.
I.

THE FAULTY CASE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AS AN ANACHRONISM

I first address Ford's claim that the civil rights system is no longer suited
to address the most intractable problems of contemporary society. After
summarizing an account of his arguments, I show that his main contentions
about civil rights as an anachronism are substantially flawed because they
are premised on an unfair extrapolation of themes from fringe cases that do
not represent the core of modem civil rights.
11. See Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L.
REv. 2027, 2028 (2008) ("Contrary to critics' frequent claims, the organizational leaders profiled here have been acutely aware of the limits of litigation in securing social change.").
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A. Civil Rights as an Anachronism

Ford acknowledges that rights played an important role in an earlier
generation. Defining a right as "a distinctive type of legal, political, social,
and moral claim" (p. 18), he accepts that "rights can provoke needed social
change and prevent expedient capitulation to powerful agents of injustice
and exploitation" (p. 19). He contends, however, that the outdated nature of
the civil rights regime is reflected by the fact that its structure is both too
narrow and too broad. It is too narrow because although Ford concedes that
civil rights were effective in responding to "outright discrimination and
overt prejudice" (p. 9), the current system cannot effectively address the
more complex and entrenched causes of social inequality that continue to
haunt our society today, such as residential segregation and lack of economic opportunity (p. 10).
The system is too broad, he says, because opportunistic parties have appropriated civil rights laws to achieve ends that have little to do with
equality or social justice. He provides two illustrations of this phenomenon.
First, he argues that civil rights have evolved into a system for validating
individuals' claims to personal entitlement. Rather than addressing real social problems, civil rights are frequently exploited by self-indulgent, fringe
claimants with personal bones to pick. "If you try," he concludes, "you can
make a case that some kind of bigotry-animus, stereotypes, or selective
sympathy and indifference-is behind almost any inequality" (pp. 81-82).
Ford supports his argument with a number of examples that he views as
abuses of civil rights laws. But he focuses on trivial claims, such as men
invoking public accommodations statutes to challenge a baseball team's
Mother's Day promotion and "ladies' nights" at bars as forms of gender
discrimination (pp. 84-88).
In another somewhat confusing narrative, he criticizes a new mother's
effort to seek longer breaks during her medical licensing exam in order to
pump breast milk. While Ford ultimately concludes that the accommodation
was justifiable, his disdain for the organized movement to protect breastfeeding mothers from discrimination is clear.2 It turns out that Ford's real
problem with the woman's claim is that on top of the request for breastfeeding breaks, she also sought more time on the exam because she suffered
from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD") (p. 40). He argues
that unlike accommodations for physical disabilities such as blindness or
paraplegia, special considerations for persons with ADHD and other types
of diagnosable learning disabilities-such as large blocks of extra time for
school or licensing exams-give these persons an unfair advantage over the
average student or job applicant. He also observes that there is disagreement
about whether ADHD is actually a disability or whether it simply lies on a

12. In a particularly dismissive comment about the woman's request, he exclaims that
"the integrity of [the licensing board's] precious exam ... didn't have a chance against the
sisterhood of virtuous lactation." P. 40.
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continuum with "garden-variety poor concentration,"' 3 suggesting that these
accommodations may not be warranted at all. As he puts it, "It's a conceptual sleight of hand to define one person's inability to answer questions
quickly and accurately as a disability that society must accommodate in order to reach the merits, when the same inability is considered a lack of merit
for other people" (p. 49).
Similarly, he contends that most age discrimination claims do not focus
on real discrimination, but rather are brought by current employees who are
fired or denied promotions, turning the law into an "age-based spoils system" (pp. 73-74). He argues that age discrimination is more complicated
than discrimination based on race or gender because there are economically
rational reasons for hiring younger workers, who earn less and have a longer
window to provide a return on employers' investments in their professional
development (pp. 68-73). He also suggests that to the extent there are serious age discrimination issues, they involve employers' refusals to hire older
workers rather than the types of claims that are typically filed (pp. 68-73).
Ford makes similar assertions about the individuated focus and narcissism of contemporary civil rights activism. On his account, rather than
mobilizing to address serious social problems or injustices in the tradition of
the civil rights movement, activists today are often directionless rebels without a cause. Mass protests-such as Louis Farrakhan's Million Man March,
the similar event held by the conservative religious men's group, the Promise Keepers, and the demonstrations supporting the Jena 6-serve as a form
of "therapy," reflecting a nostalgia for the past and seeking an outlet for selfrighteous indignation, but not advancing important causes (one can imagine
that Ford had little patience for the Occupy Wall Street movement and its
offshoots) (pp. 175-81). Another target of Ford's critique is Critical Mass, a
movement of bicyclists' rights advocates that organizes mass rides in major
cities to call attention to concerns about bicycle-friendly traffic laws and
automobile drivers' unwillingness to share the roads (pp. 182-84). But the
movement, he argues, has itself become violent and aggressive toward drivers, in addition to causing huge traffic problems at great inconvenience to
other citizens (p. 183). Instead of advancing its cause, he suggests, Critical
Mass has simply generated public resentment toward its protestors' selfish
conduct for engaging in what he views as thuggish behavior without giving
serious attention to legal or policy reform (pp. 182-84). Contemporary civil
rights activism loses its capacity to inspire, he says, because of its selfish
mentality (p. 185).
According to Ford, a second way in which contemporary plaintiffs abuse
the breadth of the system is by drawing into the law many claims of discrimination that do not belong in the civil rights arena at all. He contends that
13. Pp. 36-37. In fact, while there is some disagreement about this issue, at least in the
context of the bar examination there is already a great degree of skepticism about those who
request accommodations based on ADHD. See Neha Sampat & Esm6 Grant, Research Project: Bar Examination Accommodations for ADHD Graduates, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 1211 (2011) (cataloging the enormous barriers that law graduates with ADHD
face when seeking accommodations for taking the bar examination).

April 2013]

Rights Lawyer Essentialism

civil rights laws have produced unintended consequences by allowing the

application of legal claims to disputes that do not implicate subordination.
For example, he contends that some plaintiffs have hijacked rights laws to
challenge matters of personal taste or preference rather than to dispute serious injustices or prejudice. To illustrate this, he discusses legal challenges to
sex-specific grooming and hiring policies, such as standards imposed on

female television news anchors and waitresses in casinos (pp. 101-07).
Sometimes, he says, image and glamour are essential to a business model.
While it would be unfortunate if such grooming standards were applied to

are not relevant, litigation is not the way to sort out
jobs where "aesthetics"
14

such differences.
Similarly, he complains that sex discrimination laws such as Title VII
have been expanded to validate challenges against virtually all forms of sexual conduct or expression, transforming the law into a "general civility code

that potentially outlaw[s] any expression with sexual or erotic content" (p.
164). The law has been stretched to prohibit not just sex discrimination, but
also "sexual" discrimination. This has resulted in making "any sexually
charged encounter, image, or statement a target of legal prohibition, whether

it reinforced male privilege and sex segregation or not.'1 5 Ford suggests that
such laws have led to overreactions by employers and schools, and he
mocks reactions such as zero-tolerance policies, "love" contracts, and the
widely publicized verbal consent requirements for all stages of physical
contact between students at Antioch College as examples of a civil rights

system gone out of control (pp. 163-66).
In sum, Ford uses all of these examples to support his claim that the
American civil rights system is outdated. On his account, most firstgeneration civil rights problems have largely been addressed by this point in
our history. But exploitative plaintiffs, lawyers, and activists have picked up

the remnants of the laws and applied them to problems that should not, in
his view, fall under the umbrella of civil rights at all.

14. Pp. 101-02. The dismissive treatment of these grooming policies trivializes the
pernicious effects they can have on the women who challenge them, particularly when their
claims are reviewed by male judges who may be disconnected from the experiences of women
in the workplace. See Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries-Appellate Review of Federal

Civil Jury Verdicts, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 237, 283-85. For thoughtful reflections on the serious
discriminatory effects of sex-specific grooming standards, see Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1048-59 (2009); Yofi Tirosh, Adjudicating
Appearance: From Identity to Personhood, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 49 (2007).

15. Pp. 166-67. It is unclear on what he bases this conclusion. It is well documented
that as the lower courts are applying Title VII, even serious sexual harassment claims are difficult to sustain precisely because courts are wary of expanding suits to the type of conduct
Ford describes. See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What
Judges and Reasonable People Believe Is Sexually Harassing,75 S. CAL. L. REv. 791, 805-19

(2002).
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B. MarginalRights, the Selection Effect, and the
Problem of Generalizability
The power of Ford's claims is substantially diluted by his tendency to
extrapolate broad conclusions from anecdotal cases, many of which are
hardly representative of the contemporary civil rights system. Although he
does not claim his work to be empirical, surely it is fair to call him to account for his selective sampling of what he regards as civil rights abuses.
While some of Ford's arguments are based on systemic or structural
issues, such as his analysis of the complexity of age discrimination (pp.
64-80), many others are based on idiosyncratic and episodic claims that
arguably do not fit within the framework of civil rights. Are we really supposed to believe that the civil rights system is broken because a few plainplaintiffs with marginal rights claims file lawsuits that do not fall within the
core issues of justice and equality? (Spoiler alert: Not all of them even win.)
Ford complains about discrimination suits challenging Mother's Day promotions at ball games and longer waiting lines for women's public rerestrooms than men's to illustrate how far bans on gender discrimination can
be stretched. But there is no evidence that these cases are representative of
contemporary gender equality litigation, or even that they occur very much
at all. He has little sympathy for those diagnosed with ADHD who seek extra time on school assignments and professional exams because he believes
that little separates them from sufferers of "garden-variety poor concentration" (p. 37). Even if he were correct, this argument would support his
broader indictment of antidiscrimination law only if these claims were representative of disability rights claims. But in fact, less than 2 percent of all
claims brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act are based on
learning disabilities.16
Ford's generalizability problems are also evident in his scathing critique
of today's brand of civil rights activism. As discussed above, he argues that
mass demonstrations today are no longer compelled by a genuine cause or
outrageous events or policies. His impatience with modem civil rights activism stems from his view that it has evolved into an aimless form of therapy
for those nostalgic for the heyday of the civil rights movement. Protests are
aimless appeals for attention, not sincere efforts at social change (pp. 17586). But among his principal examples is the protest surrounding the
so-called Jena 6, a reaction to a troubling set of events in which the multiple
and conflicting accounts of what actually occurred can only be described as
Faulknerian. 17 It is difficult to imagine that those events serve as an object
lesson for all contemporary civil rights activism.
16.
EQUAL

See ADA Charge Data by Impairment/Bases - Receipts FY 1997 - FY 2011, U.S.
EMP'T

COMM'N,

http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-receipts.cfm

(last visited Aug. 21, 2012).
17. See WILLIAM FAULKNER, ABSALOM, ABSALOM! (1936). In this classic of Southern
literature, Faulkner conveys the story of three families during the Civil War era as told from
the perspective of multiple characters who offer a range of different, often contradictory, ac-

counts of the same events.
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As with his litigation examples, it is unfair for Ford to paint all modem
rights activism with this broad brush. Even if he accurately characterizes
some of these demonstrations and leaders, other core civil rights activism
clearly has specific causes, direction, and focus and involves serious attempts at political mobilization. In 2008, tens of thousands of demonstrators
took part in a coordinated national demonstration for marriage equality after
California voters enacted Proposition 8, which overturned the state supreme
court's decision legalizing gay marriage.18 Hundreds of thousands of protestors turned out to angrily oppose President Bush's decision to invade Iraq in
2003.19 Wisconsin citizens showed up in huge numbers to protest Governor
Scott Walker's retrograde labor policies. 2° At the other end of the political
spectrum, whatever one thinks of the Tea Party's efforts, it is hard to dispute
that it has a concrete purpose and political agenda, which it has advanced in
part through activism.
What is more, not all activism takes place on a national stage. Indeed,
public demonstrations may be more effective when community organizing
advances discrete causes at the local level. The labor movement, for example, has effectively engaged in mobilization campaigns to raise awareness of
unfair labor practices by nonunion employers.21 Organizations such as the
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now ("ACORN")
have conducted successful local campaigns to prevent exploitation of lowincome communities. 22 Ford completely overlooks this type of activism.
In addition to the overall generalizability problem, like other analyses
that focus only on reported cases or even filed litigation, Ford's arguments
are limited by what is known as the "selection effect." It is widely understood that the sample of cases that reach the trial or appellate stage of
litigation is not representative of the overall body of cases in the legal

18. See Jesse McKinley, Across U.S., Big Rallies for Same-Sex Marriage,N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2008, at A25, http://www.nytimes.com2008/ll/16/us/16protest.html. To be sure,
Ford acknowledges that immigrants and gays and lesbians are groups for which the civil rights
movement still has much work to do. Pp. 245-46. But that again raises the question why he
would want to abandon the civil rights regime for all groups because of the misdirection of a
few.
19. See Jennifer 8. Lee, The Nation: Critical Mass; How ProtestersMobilized So Many
and So Nimbly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, at WK3, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23/

weekinreview/the-nation-critical-mass-how-protesters-mobiized-so-many-and-s-nimby.htm.
20. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Timothy Williams, Rallies for Labor in Wisconsin and
Beyond, N.Y. TIMES,

Feb. 27,

2011,

at A4,

http://www.nytimes.com/201102/27/us/

27rally.html.
21. See Jon E. Pettibone, Bannering Neutrals-Coercive Secondary Boycott or Free
Speech?, 18 LAB. LAW. 349 (2003).

22. See JAMES DEFILIPPIS ET AL., CONTESTING COMMUNITY: THE LIMITS AND POTENTIAL OF LOCAL ORGANIZING 159-60 (2010). For more on local organizing activity, see Marc
Pilisuk et al., Coming Together for Action: The Challenge of Contemporary Grassroots Community Organizing,52 J. Soc. ISSUES 15 (1996).
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system.23 The selection effect limits the conclusions that one can draw from
observations about a particular legal regime because the sample of cases
does not include legal disputes that are resolved without litigation-either
because the clearer cases never arise due to the law's prophylactic effect or
because those that are filed are quickly settled. 24 Ford's conclusions about
the civil rights system, based on a few cherry-picked cases, quite possibly
distort his view of that system since much of what occurs happens beneath
the surface. If, as Ford himself surmises, many of the core civil rights problems have been overcome, it is likely that much overt discrimination is
subdued by the existence of the very legal regime that he seeks to dismantle.
In short, Ford's selected examples could easily persuade those who pay
little attention to the civil rights system that the system has indeed become
an anachronism. But even Ford concedes that "[m]ost of the time, people
pressing for new legal rights have good intentions and are addressing serious
social problems" (p. 89). He ignores those claims, and instead builds his
thesis on a foundation of fringe examples. Challenging the regime of civil
rights litigation based on what many may regard as frivolous cases is somewhat like Ronald Reagan famously calling for the dismantling of the social
safety net based on anecdotes about "welfare queens," who purportedly
abused the system to avoid working.2 5 Like Reagan, Ford's problem is that
he wants to throw out the entire system because of the alleged abuses of a
few.

Finally, even if these examples were somehow more representative of
current civil rights cases, they would not necessarily reflect a system in crisis. First, some of Ford's arguments are simply based on his own skepticism
about specific types of claims and his normative assertion that they are not
legitimate concerns of the law. For instance, his critique of disability rights
suits by persons diagnosed with ADHD questions whether these plaintiffs
are getting a special advantage over others rather than simply gaining a level
playing field.26 While Ford suggests that these claims involve a "conceptual
sleight of hand" (p. 49), what he's really arguing about is the application of
two well-established principles of disability discrimination law that are designed to calibrate the system to ensure fairness-the requirement that, in
the employment context, the disabled person is otherwise "qualified" to do

23. Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework
with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 337 (1990) (stating that cases reaching formal
adjudication are not "a random sample of the mass of underlying cases").
24. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 78 (1990) ("A sample of
cases litigated to judgment will be biased in favor of uncertainty because when the outcome is
clear the parties will usually settle the case before trial.").
25. See Leland Ware & David C. Wilson, Jim Crow on the "Down Low": Subtle Racial
Appeals in PresidentialCampaigns, 24 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 299, 311 (2009).
26. P. 36. His claims here resonate with attacks on affirmative action and laws that
prohibit discrimination against gays and lesbians as establishing a form of "special rights"
rather than eradicating legal and social inequalities. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
637-39 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the work required 27 and that the employer or other institution need only

provide "reasonable" accommodations, not limitless ones.2 8 Perhaps what he
rather than
is actually troubled by is the misapplication of these standards,
29
the underlying antidiscrimination principles that they advance.

Second, even if novel legal claims are the norm rather than the exception, there is still great value in allowing those claims to proceed. The law is
enhanced in important ways through the assertion of new rights claims, even
if they are not all accepted. Indeed, as I discuss below, one of the principal
changes that rights lawyers have had to make is adapting their practices to a
contemporary legal and political regime that is almost universally hostile to
the pursuit of new constitutional rights, including equality rights, through
traditional litigation campaigns.
One of the biggest impediments to the evolution of constitutional rights
is the ossifying impact of legal doctrines that prevent the development of
new constitutional rules across a variety of procedural contexts.30 Over the
past generation, the Supreme Court and Congress have established a menu
of judicial and statutory barriers that impede much of the law-pronouncing
function of the federal courts. Some examples of these pervasive restrictions
include the Court's decision in Teague v. Lane, which established that prisoners cannot assert claims based on novel constitutional rights in collateral
attacks on state law convictions and sentences, even if they properly asserted
such rights in their original appeals; 31 Congress's endorsement, or arguably
expansion, of the Teague new-law rule in the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act,32 which establishes an extraordinarily deferential standard that federal courts must apply when reviewing state court decisions in a
manner that also impedes the law's evolution; 33 the Court's trend toward
27. See 29 C.ER. § 1630.2(m) (2012) ("The term 'qualified,' with respect to an individual with a disability, means that the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience,
education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual
holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of such position.").
28. See id. § 1630.9 (failure to provide reasonable accommodation constitutes discrimination absent undue hardship).
29. Admittedly, the issue of whether a person with ADHD is disabled under federal
antidiscrimination law is complex and fact specific. The law does require, however, that plaintiffs show that their disability causes them to perform below the ability of the average person.
See Craig S. Lerner, "Accommodations" for the Learning Disabled: A Level Playing Field or
Affirmative Action for Elites?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1043, 1086-90 (2004).
30. See Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1
(2002); cf John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in ConstitutionalLaw, 109 YALE L.J.
87 (1999) (arguing that limitations on money damages for constitutional violations facilitate
constitutional change by lowering innovation costs).
489 U.S. 288, 305-10 (1989) (plurality opinion).
31.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
33. See Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness,Habeas Theory,
and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 535, 629-30 (1999) (observing that by
constraining courts' law-pronouncing function, § 2254(d)(1) undermines the nature of law

itself).
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widening the "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule; 34 and the
Court's continuing expansion of the official immunity doctrines, especially
qualified immunity, 35 which effectively makes it impossible to assert novel
constitutional rights claims through damages suits against officials under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.36 Together, these rules operate in a severe manner that narrows the available forums in which constitutional evolution can occur.37 And
these impediments don't even include the panoply of federal court decisions
that also prevent constitutional evolution-the Court's expansive sovereign
immunity doctrine,38 narrow conceptions of justiciability, particularly in the
area of standing,3 9 and the abstention doctrines.4 0 Ford argues that the civil

rights system has led to the proliferation of new and unworthy types of antidiscrimination claims, and therefore advocates a new system in which such
claims could not be readily asserted. But cutting off novel civil rights claims
in that way risks imposing the same type of barriers to innovation in civil
rights and the courts'
ability to pronounce new law that these other doctrines
4
have wrought.

1

What is more, new rights claims also may serve values beyond the litigation context in which they are asserted. For example, Ford's attacks on
cases challenging sex-specific grooming standards are based on his assertion
that civil rights should address base forms of gender subordination, but
34. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147-48 (2009) (expanding the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule and allowing the admissibility of evidence obtained during
an unlawful arrest that occurred because of a clerical mistake reporting an outstanding warrant
from an adjoining county).
35. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified
Immunity in the Age of Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IowA L. REV. 261, 327 (1995) (arguing that qualified immunity creates uncertainty about the meaning of constitutional law and
thereby impedes the law-pronouncing function of constitutional adjudication). Even the efforts
by some members of the Court to ameliorate the effects of qualified immunity by requiring
lower courts to decide the merits of new-law claims before resolving the immunity question
were short-lived. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232-36 (2009) (abandoning the requirement that courts in constitutional damages cases first determine the merits of the case
before deciding the defendant's entitlement to qualified immunity).
37. See Pamela S. Karlan, Shoe-Homing, Shell Games, and Enforcing Constitutional
Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 78 UMKC L. REV. 875, 887 (2010) (noting that Pearson
"paradoxically throws the process of constitutional elaboration right back into the criminal
process from which the Court's decisions in Hudson [v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006)] and
Herring expelled it").
38. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
39. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
40. See, e.g., R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (requiring
federal courts to abstain from deciding federal constitutional questions where the case might
be resolved on the basis of state law that is unsettled).
41.
Arguments against use of litigation to assert new rights typically have been invoked
to chill public interest litigation. See David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on
Progressive Public-InterestLawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 237-40 (2003) (recounting efforts by conservative groups to attack Tulane Law School's environmental law clinic for
asserting "novel" theories of legal liability against small businesses).
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should not be an arena where society debates matters of taste and aesthetics.
As he says, "Those who oppose all such grooming policies complain that
they reflect 'stereotypes,' but one person's sex stereotype is another's sensible distinction. 42 Setting aside for a moment the fact that his assertion itself
begs the question of what constitutes gender discrimination, he also completely ignores the fact that these lawsuits may contribute not only to the
growth of legal doctrine but also to a broader public discourse that could
inspire cultural reexamination of the very gender stereotypes that underlie
these policies. Litigation can not only accomplish growth in the law through
judicial decisions but can also serve an important educative and deliberative
43
function .
II. AN UNNUANCED CRITIQUE OF CIVIL RIGHTS

A related, but slightly different, theme of Ford's work is that even if civil
rights are not anachronistic, the restrictions and remedies the law puts into
place are not sufficiently adaptable or flexible to address contemporary
problems. That is, the civil rights regime lacks sufficient nuance. He
supports this assertion, first, by focusing on the consequences of having
bright-line antidiscrimination rules and, second, by claiming that the traditional remedies of damages and injunctive relief are ineffective, and even
counterproductive.
A. Rigid Rules, Inflexible Remedies, and Nuance

One way in which Ford makes the case that civil rights lack nuance is by
focusing on the inflexibility of formal civil rights rules barring discrimination and describing how they can be misapplied. Constitutional and statutory
protections against discrimination typically forbid all explicit or intentional
forms of discrimination based on a protected category, such as race or gender. Ford condemns the rigidity of antidiscrimination law for opening the

door to more frivolous applications challenging relatively benign forms of
discrimination, such as claims by women that they suffer from disproportionately long lines for public restrooms as compared to men (pp. 89-92).
He also blames formal antidiscrimination rules for being so broad that they
can be used to attack business practices that people may find distasteful, but

that may not be the product of bias, as in the case of the sex-specific
42. P. 105. One wonders what civil rights law would look like if the defendants could
simply assert a defense that their discrimination was a sensible distinction to them. The "sensible distinction" defense ironically also resonates with Herbert Wechsler's claim that it is not
clear, applying neutral principles, how African American students' interests in desegregated
public schools are superior to the claims of segregationists, or vice versa. See Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32-33
(1959).
43.

See
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grooming requirements discussed earlier (pp. 95-107). As he says, "There
are reasonable arguments for careful and limited racial profiling, sexspecific dress codes, and sex-segregated bathrooms, but to make them, one
must reject categorical rules against discrimination and turn to more factspecific, nuanced judgments" (p. 122).
In a more serious and legitimate complaint, he contends, as have many
other critics, that a race-blind application of antidiscrimination laws has had
the perverse effect of invalidating government and private efforts to eradicate the effects of past discrimination against people of color. He draws on
examples such as the Supreme Court's decision in Ricci v. DeStefano,4
which struck down the New Haven fire department's decision to set aside
the results of a promotion exam because they had led to the promotion of no
racial minorities and the city was concerned that using those results might
lead to a civil rights suit. The Court held that the city's express consideration
of race as a factor in throwing out the test was itself discriminatory against
the white firefighters who otherwise would have qualified for promotion.45 A
similar example of antidiscrimination law being turned on its head is Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.

1,46

in

which the Court held that public school districts could not carry out a student-assignment plan based on race even when that plan was designed to
enhance racial balance in their schools (pp. 154-58).
Another important way in which Ford suggests that the legal regime
lacks nuance is through the system of remedies for civil rights violations. He
argues that a major flaw in the current civil rights scheme is that the availability of individual damages remedies for violations of antidiscrimination
laws creates perverse incentives for opportunistic plaintiffs to bring claims
in the pursuit of personal gain. "Because we've defined social justice in
terms of rights, it's natural to assume that some sort of individual restitution
is the ultimate goal. But perhaps individual compensation shouldn't be the
main objective; maybe it is a means that has become confused with the
end. ' 47 He even goes so far as to suggest that a damages regime may create
"desegregation bounty hunters," out for a quick buck rather than (or at least
in addition to) social justice (p. 225).
Ford is no more benevolent toward two critical features of the civil
rights enforcement system--class action lawsuits and structural injunctions.
He is highly critical of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes litigation, a class
action suit that was recently rejected by the Supreme Court. 48 Dukes was a
nationwide class action Title VII claim brought on behalf of female WalMart employees alleging that the company's practices had resulted in lower
pay and fewer promotions for women workers than male workers. Ford
44.
45.

557 U.S. 557 (2009).
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 592.

46. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
47. P. 225. Ford does not address the fact that damages awards in civil rights cases are
often relatively small, which raises doubts about the extent of such incentives.
48.

131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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agrees with the Supreme Court's decision, which accepted Wal-Mart's argument that because of the decentralized nature of its management policies,
the plaintiff class could not establish that the claims of the women were sufficiently common to justify bringing a class action claim. He suggests that
the Dukes decision exposes a flaw in the civil rights system-class actions
do not have the capacity to address massively complicated social controversies by large groups of plaintiffs who have suffered many different types of
injuries (and provide a windfall for many who have not suffered at all) (pp.
210-17). While he acknowledges that class actions have been important
civil rights tools because of their capacity to deter widespread, overtly discriminatory employment practices, he suggests that they are not flexible
enough to address the more complex management practices that are common in the modem workplace (pp. 212-14, 218).
On Ford's account, structural injunctions suffer from similar problems
of inflexibility that make them ill suited to adapt to modem civil rights challenges. Here, he recounts the argument laid out by so many others before
him about the ineffectiveness of the remedies implemented by lower courts
49
to desegregate public schools in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education.
Ford laments the manner in which Brown has been lionized as a bellwether
for civil rights advancement, when in fact the complexities of implementing
desegregation remedies have perplexed and frustrated judges and civil rights
advocates alike for years. For instance, he points out that busing and other
injunctive remedies were ineffective because of the resulting movement of
white families to outlying suburbs and because these remedies did not really
address the intransigence of residential segregation, the underlying cause of
much of the racial separation in schools (pp. 145-54). Reliance on injunctions to fix the problems of segregation, he suggests, also resulted in the
downplaying of economic justice issues and the need for more resources for
public schools in predominantly black neighborhoods (pp. 136-44). To anyone who has paid attention to the literature critiquing Brown over the past
couple of decades, none of this will be a surprise.
All of this leads Ford to call for a complete overhaul of the civil rights
system to set aside these outmoded and rigid tools. Instead, he suggests, we
should think about civil rights not as an entitlement system but as a regulatory problem, susceptible to a broad, policy-based approach to solving the
technical and multidimensional problems that confront today's society (although he does not actually map out the full extent of his administrative
solution) (pp. 230-36). Instead of individual damages claims, we could have
regulations in place that promote better civil rights policies and impose fines
for noncompliance (pp. 224-25). After all, he says, monetary payments can
achieve deterrence without regard to who gets the dollars. We should discard
the clunky devices of class actions and large-scale injunctions in favor of a
regulatory scheme that takes into account the competing interests of the relevant constituencies and crafts solutions that effectively respond to the
49. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a widely cited account of this same critique, see Paul
Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983).
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structural problems causing the harms we want to eradicate. For example,
citing a federal judge who was frustrated with monitoring post-Brown
school decrees, Ford suggests that desegregation might have been better
accomplished by making it a condition of receiving federal education spending rather than the object of court orders.50 Similarly, establishing
government rewards for those who hire more workers from underrepresent51
ed groups could encourage employers to promote workplace diversity.
Racial disparities in the criminal justice system could better be handled by a
careful reexamination of the effect of the war on drugs on minority communities rather than through individual discrimination claims (pp. 236-37).
Governments could create incentives for police departments to collect data
about the impact of their "stop and frisk" policies to evaluate whether those
policies have disparate racial impacts. 2 Ford claims that only by completely
rethinking the way the law approaches civil rights can we begin to effectively address these serious social issues.
B. Rights, Remedies, and Nuance

Like his claims about the anachronistic nature of civil rights, Ford's
suggestion that the entire system is broken because some parties seek to
exploit bright-line antidiscrimination rules suffers from a problem of gener-

50. Pp. 153-54. This point seems pretty fanciful. First, although Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act has been in effect since 1964, there is no evidence suggesting that this type of
federal funding cutoff as a means of enforcing civil rights is frequently invoked. See, e.g.,
Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482, 512 n.188 (1987). This may be a product of lack of
resources for enforcement agencies, see Eileen Kaufman, DiscriminationCases in the 2000
Term, 18 ToURo L. REV. 1, 7 (2001), administrative discretion, see Myrna E. Friedman, Note,
Administrative Cutoff of FederalFunding Under Title VI: A ProposedInterpretation of "Program", 52 IND. L.J. 651, 664 n.68 (1977); Note, Enforcing a CongressionalMandate: LEAA
and Civil Rights, 85 YALE L.J. 721, 724-25 (1976), or disincentives to take the extreme step
of a funding cutoff that may have other adverse consequences for the recipients and the people
they serve, see Arthur R. Block, Enforcement of Title VI Compliance Agreements by Third
Party Beneficiaries, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 36-38 (1983); see also Eloise Pasachoff,
Special Education, Poverty and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1413, 1480 (2011) (observing that the power of the U.S. Department of Education's Office of
Civil Rights to cut off all federal funding to school districts for noncompliance with special
education regulations is an "option so dramatic that its threat is rarely credible").
51.
P. 234. He believes that employees who do suffer wrongful discrimination can
simply seek employment elsewhere. This approach is reminiscent of a pure market-based
approach to employment discrimination problems. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws

(1992).

52. This suggestion appears not in the book but in an editorial that Ford wrote in conjunction with the book's publication. Richard Thompson Ford, Op-Ed., Moving Beyond Civil
Rights, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 28, 2011, at A31, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/opinion/
moving-beyond-civil-rights.html. In reaction to the editorial, the Executive Director of the
Center for Constitutional Rights pointed out in a letter to the editor that the New York City
Police Department's "agreement" to collect such data was the product of civil rights litigation.
Vincent Warren, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2011, at A30, http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/11/03/opinion/a-new-way-to-achieve-civil-rights.html.
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alizability. While the structure of that system is by no means ideal, Ford's
frustration with its abuse inspires him to want to throw the whole system
out-or at least important parts of it. To some degree, Ford's critique of civil
rights rules seems like little more than an elementary illustration of the limits
of legal formalism. Laws that prohibit overt discrimination against protected
classes are inherently overinclusive, as are all legal rules (in contrast to openended legal standards). 53 But it is unclear how Ford's prescription of
administrative regulations would be preferable. Administrative regulation also
requires rules or at least a set of parameters that bureaucrats must enforce or
implement. To guard against discrimination based on race and gender, those
identities must be defined in some way as protected. Unless Ford envisions a
civil rights administrative agency that simply enforces regulatory standards
against "unfairness" or "acts that subordinate," it's hard to see how his system
would be any more flexible than the existing regime.
Moreover, his critiques of color-blind scrutiny of affirmative action laws
are nothing new. By now, it is obvious that such laws are caught up in a
world in which the majority of the Supreme Court views them as no less
suspect than laws that are designed to harm racial minorities. That is a value
judgment that, like Ford, I believe is wrong. As Justice Blackmun pronounced nearly a generation ago, "In order to get beyond racism, we must
first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some
persons equally, we must treat them differently."54 But even the outcomes in
the Court's affirmative action cases do not justify eliminating lawsuits to
challenge race discrimination against subordinated groups. Again, much of
this line of Ford's criticism seems to offer little more than a basic attack on
legal formalism.
Ford's critique of civil rights remedies as insufficiently nuanced or calibrated is similarly flawed. As described above, one of his biggest quibbles is
with individual damages claims, a form of "entitlement" that he blames for
often distorting incentives and failing to address systemic problems that demand a more measured, technocratic policy solution. Thus, Ford argues that
damages suits do little of the work they are supposed to do-they both incentivize and reward the wrong parties (though he does not suggest that they
don't also incentivize victims of core discrimination), and they do not address systemic barriers to equality. Class actions and structural injunctions
cannot be sufficiently tailored to produce balanced, context-sensitive solutions to the complex and entrenched nature of the underlying causes of
major social problems.
To some degree, Ford seems to want it both ways. He criticizes damages
suits for being too individualized and failing to address systemic issues of
discrimination. Yet he criticizes structural remedies and class action suits as
overbroad and lacking adaptability to individualized harms or problems. But
administrative solutions, which Ford embraces, may suffer from many of the
53. See Chen, supra note 36, at 282-83.
54. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
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same limitations. He is correct that administrative, policy-based approaches
may be more adaptable and creative, and can address the underlying issue
from a broad, problem-solving perspective. But they also cannot be tailored
to individual injustices. That is, administrative regulations and enforcement
may be more adaptable at a metalevel, but it is hard to imagine anyone arguing that a large federal bureaucracy would be more sensitive to the wide
range of civil rights disputes than the individualized consideration of discrimination claims available only through adjudication.55
As just one example, Ford singles out learning disability claims as a category of civil rights claims that are problematic because they sometimes
result in providing special advantages to people who seek accommodations,
rather than remedying unfair, burdensome practices. In other words, these
claimants are better off than the average person because of disability rights
law. A more effective approach, he suggests, would be to reconsider from a
systemic level whether educators and employers rely too heavily on standardized tests (p. 237). If Ford is right, some discrimination claims are
justified and some are not. The answer to that is not a categorical, administratively produced policy solution but an individually tailored consideration
of specific disability claimants. And that is exactly what civil rights claims
can offer-an individualized assessment of a person's specific disability,
whether he or she is "otherwise qualified" to perform the job or task at hand,
and whether a "reasonable accommodation" can remove the disadvantage
caused by the disabling condition.56 Individual civil rights claims contribute
to nuance-they don't detract from it.
Another flaw in Ford's argument is that his critique disaggregates civil
rights remedies. As I have argued elsewhere, civil rights remedies must be
viewed not as isolated, self-contained solutions but as part of a larger set of
tools to address rights violations and systemic social challenges.5 7 Damages
may be more suitable to address some social issues than injunctions or class
actions; other times, the situation may be reversed. In the realm of constitutional litigation, the Supreme Court has sometimes established impediments
to specific remedies to protect structural constitutional concerns, but has
typically provided an alternative remedy to ensure that rights do not go unenforced.58 This complementary structure of remedies has served the goals
of constitutional enforcement well and is a critical aspect of the architecture
of rights. The current structure permits the legal system to accommodate
varying concerns about remedies in specific contexts and tailor them to specific rights problems. Ford's suggestion that the system should focus solely

55. Moreover, Ford does not address the potential dilemma of having administrative
officials who are part of the political system dealing with controversial civil rights issues,
rather than (at least theoretically) independent courts that may counteract majoritarian impulses that foster discrimination.
56.

See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.

57.
58.

Chen, supra note 8.
Id. at 889.

April 2013]

Rights Lawyer Essentialism

on administrative regulation and policy-based solutions would completely
9
undermine the careful balance of the constitutional remedies scheme.
Moreover, like litigation, civil rights activism should be viewed not in

isolation but as part of a broader set of actions that may influence social
movements. Critical Mass, for example, may inconvenience large numbers
of San Francisco commuters (incidentally, the same complaints were made
6
about the Selma-to-Montgomery civil fights marches). " But Critical Mass
both nationaleffects,
has also had tremendous organizing and mobilization
6
ly and internationally. " And the overarching social issue-road and traffic

design to facilitate commuting by non-fossil-fuel vehicles-is concrete
(although Critical Mass, like other examples of activism that Ford singles
out, might not even be viewed as a movement for "rights" in the same
sense as earlier forms of activism). Moreover, since the advent of the Crit-

ical Mass protests, in many cities there has been greater cooperation
between the protest leaders and police departments, which frequently provide police escorts to fide with each demonstration to ensure better
62
communication and safety while also protecting the fights of protestors.

A final consideration that Ford does not account for is the concept that
remedies shape rights. That is, the substantive definition of rights may be
materially different depending on the context in which the rights are adjudicated.63 As Nancy Leong observes, rights that are adjudicated only in one

procedural context may be shaped by features unique to that context, which
may limit the consideration of relevant interests and facts in ways that distort the meaning of those rights.64 The evolution of the law is enhanced by
having rights defined in multiple contexts. Thus, another cost of abandoning
the current civil rights regime and placing fights policy solely in the hands
of administrative bureaucracies is that there will no longer be opportunities

to shape fights across such contexts.

59. To be fair, I have argued that the Court itself has already begun tinkering with this
balance in ways that also threaten constitutional enforcement. Id. at 910-16.
60. See Protesting Whites Heckled in Selma, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 7, 1965, § 1,
at 1 ("[Alabama Governor George C. Wallace] said at a special news conference in Montgomery that such a march is not 'conducive to the orderly flow of traffic and commerce within and
through the state of Alabama. The additional hazard placed on highway travel by such actions
cannot be countenanced.' ").
Indeed, the movement has reached global proportions. See S.F. CRITICAL MASS,
61.
http://www.sfcriticalmass.org/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2012).
62. Gideon Orion Oliver, A Criminal Mess: New York City's Response to Critical Mass
Bicycle Rides, 2004-2010, 67 NAT'L LAW. GUILD REV. 37, 37 (2010) ("Prior to the 2004
Republican National Convention in New York City ...Critical Mass rides had occurred in
Manhattan for at least a decade with almost universal police acquiescence, escort, or facilitation.").
63. See Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405,406 (2012).
64. Id. at 462-63.
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III. RIGHTS LAWYER ESSENTIALISM
A. Ford's Reproach of Rights Lawyers
Ford's critique of lawyers is consistent with the critiques of a generation
of rights critics preceding him. Conservative critics offer well-rehearsed,
normative critiques of public interest litigation based on their view of the
illegitimacy of antidemocratic social change (what they refer to pejoratively
as "social engineering") through the courts. 65 But attacks on rights lawyers
from the left have been even more damning. Critics from the left have leveled claims at public interest litigation that suggest, like Ford, that public
interest law practice does not advance social causes in meaningful, sustainable, and effective ways (though, unlike Ford, most of these critics reserve
their most severe antipathy for litigation). 66 They have argued that rights
lawyers cannot achieve sustainable progress because there is often backlash
that causes regression from initial success, and because courtroom victories
frequently mask real change, which occurs through the political process. 67
Accordingly, they suggest that rights litigation is a waste of time, both because it is not actually successful in achieving social change and because it
detracts attention and resources from more meaningful and sustainable
forms of work such as mobilization, political lobbying, and community organizing. In this sense, the critics claim that rights lawyers offer nothing but
"hollow hope" and create false expectations of sustainable social transformation. 68 Finally, the assault on rights lawyers has focused on the concern
that they are self-righteous litigation hawks who care for their own causes
but not much for either their clients or the subtleties of the dialectic political
process. 69 Such critiques have not only influenced legal scholarship; they
have had an impact on the allocation of resources for public interest lawyering and the priorities of organizations engaged in social change work.
Ford's book embraces many of these critiques. His claim that rights
ought to be viewed more as policy questions resonates with the conservative
critique that rights lawyering is antidemocratic. His repeated suggestion that
rights litigation does more harm than good; his argument that the role of law
and litigation in accomplishing the goal of equality has been exaggerated;7"
65.

See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 303 (1988) (summarizing such

arguments).
66. See, e.g., MCCANN, supra note 2, at 200; ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 425.
67. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2004); RosENBERG, supra note 2, at 425.

68. ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 427. A more radical version of this critique claims that
the rights-based litigation approach legitimizes and perpetuates the existing social order and
thereby impedes social progress. Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking
Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
369, 375 (1983); see also SCHEINGOLD, supra note 2, at 5-7, 204.
69. See, e.g., L6PEZ, supra note 9.
70. See, e.g., p. 158 ("Civil rights litigation has never been the main engine of social
justice in the United States.").
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his assertion that rights litigation rarely changes public opinion but usually
only follows it (pp. 127-29); and his contention that civil rights have not
offered a clear prescription for social change but offer false hope to social
justice advocates and the public (p. 21), are all consistent with the progressive critique of rights.
Ford's disdain for civil rights lawyers is patent. At one point, he even
suggests that
[l]ike a group of drunken fraternity brothers competing to perform the
most dangerous and outrageous stunt, lawyers, legal scholars, and civil
rights activists strive to outdo each other in developing the most extreme
and expansive interpretations of legal entitlements. Too many activists and
lawyers attack unobjectionable customs and sensible practices that offend
only the most expansive and uncompromising interpretation of the law. (p.
23)

My final response to Ford's work addresses these claims.
B. The Real Rights Lawyers of the Twenty-First Century

Like the contentions of past rights critics, Ford's argument suffers from
an incomplete understanding of the transformations that have occurred in
public interest lawyering in recent years. As with his sweeping claims about
civil rights litigation, his generalizations about rights lawyers are flawed
because they simply are not representative. The cause-lawyering literature is
replete with examples of this unrelenting attack on public interest lawyers,
frequently depicting them as self-righteous and hell-bent on reforming the
law from the top down, with sea-shifting Supreme Court decisions as their
ultimate goal. Gerald Lfpez's "Teresa" is the paradigmatic "bad" public
interest lawyer who condescends to her clients, sees litigation as the only
71
solution to social problems, and is dismissive of community involvement.
Numerous rights critics have echoed this sentiment. I call this practice
"rights lawyer essentialism,"72 because it attributes to all rights lawyers the
characteristics or qualities of a select few. It is a critique built on a caricature
of public interest lawyers that diminishes and devalues much of the important work they have done and continue to do.
71. L6PEZ, supra note 9, at 13-17. In L6pez's pathbreaking book, he critiques what he
argues is a common practice described as "regnant" lawyering, through which lawyers, among
other things, exploit power over clients, control decisions about litigation, fail to learn about or
understand the communities they represent, and disregard their subordinated clients' ability to
help themselves. Id. at 23-24. To support his claims, he includes a series of fictional narratives
that he based on lawyers he has observed as well as "imagined characters and storylines,"
including one about Teresa, the fictional director of an impact litigation group. Id. at 8.
72. For an explanation of the concept of essentialism, see Teresa Robertson, Essential
vs. Accidental Properties, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Apr. 29, 2008), http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/essential-accidental/. The concept of essentialism has also been used extensively in
critical feminist and race literature focusing on the attribution of supposedly common or universal experiences to define marginalized groups. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialismin FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 588-89 (1990).
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My critique of Ford and these other scholars rests on a couple of claims.
First, these depictions of rights lawyers were probably never entirely accurate to begin with. While litigation has always played an important role in
rights lawyering, closer examination of the history of American public interest law reveals that lawyers involved in rights campaigns have always been
mindful of other tactical options and the relationship of litigation to other
forms of social reform.73 Even stretching back to the early part of the
twentieth century, lawyers for the leading national civil rights organizations
seriously debated the role of litigation and questioned its efficacy.74 They
engaged in political as well as litigation tactics to serve both their short- and
long-term goals.
Second, to the extent these caricatures of rights lawyers were ever descriptively accurate, they are no longer true, or are at least much less true
than they once were. 75 In part as a reaction to increasing barriers to the establishment of new rights through more traditional impact litigation, public
interest practice has undergone a substantial transformation in recent years.
These challenges have compelled lawyers to retool their tactical arsenals
and pay much more acute attention to a broader way of thinking about social reform. Public interest lawyers' roles have expanded to include a range
of tactics that remain central to the pursuit of rights but comprise a practice
that is broader, richer, and ultimately more sustainable than the traditional
model of rights litigation. Lawyers are still central to the pursuit of rights,
but litigation now typically represents only one piece of a larger mosaic of
approaches-a practice described in the cause-lawyering literature as "tacti76
cal pluralism.
Some examples of the more complex, richer, and subtler role that lawyers play can be drawn from some contemporary social change campaigns. 77
73.

See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
1925-1950 (1987); Robert L. Rabin, Lawyersfor Social Change: Perspectiveson
Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REv. 207, 210-24 (1976) (discussing early litigation strategies of the NAACP and ACLU but describing how litigation complemented other strategies).
74. TuSHNET, supra note 73, at 8-9 (describing NAACP leadership's debate over
whether to spend resources on organizing the black community and addressing economic
issues rather than on litigation).
75. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 11, at 2046-49.
76. CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 43, at 518; Barbara L. Bezdek, Alinsky's Prescription: Democracy Alongside Law, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 723, 748 (2009); Scott L.
Cummings, Law in the Labor Movement's Challenge to Wal-Mart:A Case Study of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 1927, 1932 (2007). In addition, it should be noted that
rights lawyers have had to adapt to the changing political climate as well and sometimes play
an important role in stemming the tide against a regression in substantive rights. As Deborah
Rhode's 2008 survey of public interest organizations and lawyers reflected, "[Pirogressive
lawyers frequently saw their mission less as gaining new ground than as holding on to what
they had." Rhode, supra note 11, at 2036.
77. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 76, at 1985 (lawyers in a local campaign to stop
siting of Wal-Mart superstore in a community viewed litigation as only one tool in their repertoire); Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for MarriageEquality, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 1235, 1312 (2010) (lawyers in the marriage equality movement expressly prioritized
nonlitigation strategies).
EDUCATION,
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Lawyers in these campaigns have demonstrated a clear understanding that
litigation is neither the only tactic available to them nor something to be
completely discarded. The nature of these campaigns also reflects two increasingly common phenomena in rights lawyering. First, attorneys are
more prone to work directly on nonlitigation, public advocacy approaches to
social change employing nontraditional legal skills such as lobbying, public
education, and community organizing. Second, to the extent that rights lawyers turn to litigation, it is often not as the central tactical choice but as a
device to support and complement nonlitigation tactics.
1. Nonlitigation Lawyering Tactics
In modem social reform campaigns, lawyers are willing and able to design campaigns that incorporate lobbying in relation to legislative reform
and popular ballot initiatives. This occurs both offensively, in the context of
actively pursuing new rights or legal duties, and defensively, through lobbying against the adoption of regressive legislation or referenda. For example,
in the California marriage equality campaign, rights movement lawyers
made a conscious decision to pursue a nonlitigation strategy and deemphasize marriage, instead focusing on legislative changes to promote civil
unions and extend benefits to domestic partners.78 This action triggered marriage equality opponents' efforts to preemptively block the state from
recognizing same-sex marriages from other states through a ballot initiative.7 9 As the struggle evolved, however, events beyond the control of the
marriage equality lawyers sparked litigation challenging San Francisco
Mayor Gavin Newsom's decision to authorize the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples.80 But even that litigation, in which the
California Supreme Court invalidated laws prohibiting same-sex marriage,81
immediately led movement lawyers back into the political arena, as they
coordinated efforts to defeat Proposition 8, a new ballot initiative that was
designed to overturn that decision.8 2 After that lobbying effort failed, lawyers outside the movement brought the currently pending litigation
challenging Proposition 8 against the83advice of those who had been coordinating the marriage equality strategy.
Similarly, lawyers have focused on lobbying to stop or slow the expansion of Wal-Mart superstores in low-income communities out of concern for
the company's labor practices. These campaigns have emphasized legislative
reform: lawyers and activists have lobbied for and helped draft local laws
banning the location of such stores, requiring local employers to pay a living
78.
79.

Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 77, at 1251-56.
Id. at 1260.

See id. at 1276-78.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 407-52 (Cal. 2008).
82. Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 77, at 1293-94.
83. Id. at 1298-99; see Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub
nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012).
80.
81.
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wage, and conditioning the granting of development permits on large retail
investors' agreement to ameliorate the negative environmental and economic
impacts their superstores will have on the local community. 84 Lawyers representing the community's interests have also lobbied against pro-Wal-Mart
legislation, which has sometimes been pressed by the company through
community groups that it has financed."
Contemporary public interest lawyers have also embraced public education and community mobilization as central to their advocacy mission.
Lawyers in the marriage equality movement have focused on laying the
groundwork for wider public acceptance of marriage equality. For example,
they have put a human face on the legal battle by showing the general public
that gay and lesbian couples, many of whom already had children together,
are simply people trying to form families.86 Similarly, lawyers working with
a local community campaign against a Wal-Mart store in Inglewood, California engaged in a public relations outreach effort to show the net negative
impact Wal-Mart stores could have on the community. In addition, they
coordinated outreach techniques that included public presentations about
Wal-Mart, phone banks, press conferences, and other media and community
education techniques designed to build public support. 87
These public education tactics are closely linked to mobilization efforts.
For example, after California voters adopted the anti-same-sex marriage
provision, Proposition 8, movement leaders coordinated a widespread effort
to mobilize the community, including coordinating a national day of protest
and utilizing new informational websites and social media.88 And the Inglewood Wal-Mart campaign was successful in part because of the conscious
connection the lawyers drew between the public education tactics and a getout-the-vote effort to mobilize opposition to a pro-Wal-Mart local ballot
89
initiative.
The incorporation of these public advocacy tactics answers rights critics
who have long argued for the need to establish broader public acceptance
through political mobilization before judicial decisions could be meaningful. 90 And much of the work has been highly successful. Litigation is still a
valuable tool, but as a potential alternative to mobilization and as an important complement to public advocacy.
2. Litigation as Complement
Lawyers retain more traditional professional roles in social campaigns
by providing legal advice in direct support of these nontraditional tactics, as
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Cummings, supra note 76, at 1948-50.
See, e.g., id. at 1960-62.
See, e.g., Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 77, at 1311.
Cummings, supra note 76, at 1961-63.
Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 77, at 1296.
See Cummings, supra note 76, at 1961-63.
See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 425.
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well as engaging in litigation that facilitates the tactics' success. In this way,
contemporary rights lawyers help social movements pursue equality, constitutional rights, and economic opportunity. While litigation is often no longer
the first option that rights lawyers turn to, it still plays an important role as
part of a menu of tactics that they may choose from, and it is increasingly
called into service not as an alternative to public advocacy work but to complement such efforts. For example, lawyers work closely with mobilization
campaigns-such as when legal teams provide criminal defense and First
Amendment litigation work to support public demonstrations-both on a
national scale, such as the recent Occupy Wall Street protests, and at the
local level. 91
Rights lawyers also work closely with political activists in support of, or
in opposition to, popular ballot initiatives at the state and local level. In addition to performing nonlitigation roles-such as researching and drafting
language for the initiatives themselves and helping constituent groups navigate the often complex procedures required under many state laws for
placing a measure on the ballot-these attorneys also litigate the often highly technical state law issues, such as whether initiatives are properly titled,
limited to a single subject, or have satisfied other procedural requirements. 92
In this manner, they find themselves on the frontlines of rights protection,
even though the cases they bring are not rights claims. At the same time,
when their political allies find themselves on the losing side of an initiative
fight, contemporary rights lawyers may file lawsuits arguing either that the
adverse measures are unconstitutional or that they were not properly adopted under state or local law.93 Conversely, rights lawyers may coordinate with
government lawyers to defend legislative gains that have been achieved
through other lobbying or mobilization efforts against the backlash of countermobilization or counterlitigation. 94
Another example of rights lawyers using litigation to support other social change tactics is when they pursue legal claims under the federal
Freedom of Information Act 95 and state open-records laws to increase

91. See Alicia A. D'Addario, Policing Protest: Protecting Dissent and Preventing Violence Through First and Fourth Amendment Law, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 97, 99
(2006); Lynda Richardson, Protecting the Right Not to Remain Silent, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 13,

2004, at B4, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/13/nyregion/13profile.html.
92. See, e.g., Steadman v. Hindman (In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause and
Summary for 1999-2000), 992 P.2d 27, 28-29 (Colo. 2000) (challenging the titling of a popularly initiated abortion referendum); Kerr v. Bradbury, 89 P.3d 1227, 1228-30 (Or. Ct. App.
2004) (successfully challenging a state ballot initiative that would have prohibited teaching
about sexual orientation in public schools because the petition did not include the full text of
the proposed amendment).
93. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 76, at 1966.
94. See, e.g., Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 77, at 1279-80 (describing preparations to defend San Francisco's issuance of marriage licenses to gay and lesbian couples).
95. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. 2012); see, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of
Justice, 511 F. Supp. 2d 56, 62-64 (D.D.C. 2007) (examining the claim that the Department of
Justice wrongfully withheld records regarding a federal policy of conducting surveillance of
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transparency in government decisionmaking and expose issues for public
discourse, such as information about department discipline against police
officers for excessive force, or use of law enforcement personnel to gather
information about political groups.96 This information can then be used to
formulate policy solutions and pressure local officials to hold hearings and
initiate legislative reform.
3. New Governance and Rights
Finally, I emphasize that my critique is not based on normative disagreement with Ford's prescription for widespread administrative and
regulatory solutions to the challenging civil rights problems confronting
today's society. First, such efforts are welcome as part of the broad set of
options available to pursue social reform and should be fully embraced.
However, they should not replace other effective tactics but should work
alongside them. Second, the type of comprehensive, collaborative, and creative approach to problem solving Ford advocates is already taking place, but
in the context of litigation rather than through administrative bureaucracies.
We have seen such efforts under way in an approach to social reform litigation that incorporates concepts of "new governance." New governance
approaches still focus on litigation, but do not rely on the typical commandand-control implementation of remedies accomplished by the hammer of a
court order. Rather, they pursue a collaborative effort to develop a negotiated remedy to a social problem that includes the involvement and input of all
stakeholders in the controversy.9" Thus, for example, the implementation
stage of prison conditions litigation may be more effective if government
officials are directly involved in developing the reforms, setting goals and
timetables, and mediating disputes over compliance.98 While this approach
still takes place in the context of litigation, it resembles the type of nuanced
approach that Ford advocates through the administrative state. Collaborative
and balanced solutions to such problems need not emerge only from an administrative process.
CONCLUSION

While there is much to be learned from Richard Thompson Ford's provocative new book, there is good reason to be cautious about accepting
many of its prescriptions. The rights regime is complicated and multifacetdomestic communications without proper preapproval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-

lance Court).
96. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Colo. v. Whitman, 159 P.3d 707, 710-11
(Colo. App. 2006) (state open-records act claim seeking disclosure of investigative records
pertaining to claims of racial profiling and excessive force by police).
97. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1015, 1019 (2004); Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and
Futureof CorrectionsLitigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 706-35 (1993).

98.

Sturm, supra note 97, at 724-32.
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ed, as are the many types of problems it seeks to address. Though we ought
to welcome Ford's original take on the limits of the system and embrace
new approaches to addressing the sometimes intractable problems of achieving equality, abandoning the rights enforcement system that has served us
well for generations would be a great leap backwards. The rights system and
the contemporary public interest lawyers who operate within its structure
are more effective and adaptable than an essentialized view of their work
suggests. As Ford continues his scholarly agenda to extend his theories to
constitutional rights,99 he should be mindful of this concern.

99. P. 240 (suggesting that his future work may develop a similar critique in the context
of constitutional rights).
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